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AN OUTLOOK ON THE USE OF RECEIVERS IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM: PEREZ v. BOSTON HOUSING
AUTHORITY
During the past quarter century, courts have expanded traditional
equitable principles' to implement large-scale institutional reform.
Since the birth of institutional reform litigation,3 federal judges have
I. The principles and powers of equity in England descended from the medieval
Chancellor, a high minister of the King who often served the crown as "an adviser,
negotiator, ambassador, propagandist and stand-in for the King." D. DOBBS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2, at 24-25, 31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
By the fifteenth century, the Chancellor functioned primarily as a judge. His court,
the English Court of Chancery, was a tribunal of dual purpose: to serve higher justice
according to the principles of natural law, and to develop flexible approaches to re-
place rigid common law rules where their enforcement would actually result in injus-
tice. Id See generally Brakel, Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 1979 A.B.F.
RES. J. 543, 546-68; Comment, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization
of Neoreceivershops to Implement Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. REV.
1161, 1174-75 [hereinafter cited as Neoreceivershps].
Equity first crossed the Atlantic in 1789 upon adoption of the Constitution of the
United States. Article III, Section 2 extends the judicial power to equity as well as
law. The colonists, entertaining a preference for trials and a distaste for conventions
of English monarchy, viewed chancery courts as contrary to the spirit of democracy.
See Brakel, supra, at 547-48.
2. The preponderance of institutional reform litigation has concerned activities of
state and local government offensive to rights protected by the federal constitution.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to legislative apportionment);
Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1144 (1974) (right to nondiscriminatory site selection by local housing authority); Da-
vis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (rights of patients in state mental
hospitals); Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (right to
non-segregated schools); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp.
676 (D. Mass. 1973), aft'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974)
(right to humane prison conditions). See generally Roberts, The Extent of Federal
Judicial Equitable Power: Receiership of South Boston High School, 12 NEW ENO. L.
REV, 55 (1976); Special Project: The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978).
3. The landmark cases of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), removed doctrinal barriers precluding close judi-
cial scrutiny of and involvement in social and political affairs. In Brown, the Supreme
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
often sought to strengthen affirmative injunction orders by ap-
pointing parajudicial officers4 to assist them in both formulating rem-
edies and supervising compliance with judicial decrees.' The
complexity and urgency of the decree in an institutional case often
Court unanimously announced that racial segregation is unconstitutional in public
education. 347 U.S. at 495. In the implementation of Brown, Brown v. Board of
Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), Chief Justice Warren instructed the courts to
employ equitable principles in formulating and effectuating desegregation remedies
in the public schools. Id at 300. The Supreme Court in Baker held that under the
Fourteenth Amendment, class action plaintiffs had standing to challenge a state ap-
portionment statute, and that ajusticiable cause of action had been stated upon which
plaintiffs would be entitled to appropriate relief. 369 U.S. at 237. See Special Project,
supra note 2, at 788 n.9.
4. The law of equity traditionally recognized three classes of officers: masters,
examiners and receivers, each having separate responsibilities. Federal courts in re-
cent years have designated court-appointed officers by a variety of other titles, how-
ever, although their functions are often quite similar to those of the original classes.
See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 2, at 786, citing United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976)
("Audit and Review Committee"); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974)
("Monitor"); Ellis v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 423 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Biracial
Committee"); Miller v. Carlson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Fla. 1975), af'd inpart, modi-
fled in part and remanded, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Ombudsman"); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ala. 1972), af'd in part, remanded in part sub noru.
Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Human Rights Committee");
Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973) ("Master Hearing Officer"); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7814 (N.D. Ala. 1973) ("Imple-
mentation Committee"); United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Local 46,
Empl. Prac. Dec. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("Administrator"). See generally Neoreceiver-
shos, supra note 1, at 1161 n.2.
Federal courts may appoint parajudicial officers pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 53, 66 and 70. Rule 53 pertains to masters, providing that: "[The] court in
which any action is pending may appoint a special master therein. As used in these
rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, a commissioner,
and an assessor." FED. R. Civ. P. 53. Although it does not directly authorize federal
courts to appoint receivers, Rule 66 nevertheless serves as a codification of federal
equity receivership practice. The Rule provides that:
An action wherein a receiver has been appointed shall not be dismissed except by
order of the court. The practice in the administration of estates by receivers or
by other similar officers appointed by the court shall be in accordance with the
practice heretofore followed in the courts of the United States or as provided in
rules promulgated by the district courts. In all other respects the action in which
the appointment of a receiver is sought or which is brought by or against a re-
ceiver is governed by these rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 66. See Brakel, supra note 1, at 549-552. For discussion pertaining to
Rule 70, see note 29 infra; Neoreceivershos, supra note 1, at 1189-90.
5. For a thorough discussion of the duties commonly performed by masters,
monitors, administrators and receivers, see Special Project, supra note 2, at 827-37.
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dictate the extent to which the court must transfer discretion from
enjoined public officials to court-appointed officers.6 In Perez v. Bos-
ton Housing Authoriy,7 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
concluded that in compelling circumstances a court of general equita-
ble jurisdiction has sufficient power to place a local housing authority
in receivership to enforce a state sanitation law.8
Plaintiffs in Perez, nine residential tenants of the Boston Housing
Authority (BHA),9 brought a class action suit'" against the Authority
6. The duties of masters, monitors, mediators and administrators, for example,
are distinguishable from those of receivers. Whereas the former may gather informa-
tion, make recommendations, or supplement the discretion of the enjoined institu-
tional defendant (depending on the court's instructions), the latter replace defendants'
officers to the extent necessary for compliance. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540
F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (public high school
placed in receivership); Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (special
master appointed for state prison); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio
1974) (master appointed for state mental health institution); Turner v. Goolsby, 255
F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966) (county school system placed in receivership).
The court in Newman v. State of Ala., 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979), placed
the state prison system in receivership. In so doing, it described the need for compre-
hensive relief as "more urgent than ever." Id at 630. A more detailed discussion of
Newman appears in the text accompanying notes 61-68 infra. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53(b), a codification of the requirement that master appointments reflect
the complexity of subject matter before the court, provides that:
In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference [to a master] shall be made only when
the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of
account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only
upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
7. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 325, 400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980). Judge Paul G. Garrity of the
Massachusetts Superior Court issued the lower court order. Perez v. Boston Hous.
Auth., No. 17222 (Mass. Sup. Ct. July 25, 1979).
8. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 353-54, 400 N.E.2d at 1248.
9. BHA, although technically an "Operating Agency" created pursuant to MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 121B, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969), functions as an independent
municipal corporation. Accordingly, BHA's rights and liabilities include the capacity
"to sue and be sued," id at § 11(2), and liability "in contract or tort in the same
manner as a private corporation." Id at § 13.
Massachusetts is one of the few jurisdictions to have enacted statutes making local
housing authorities liable in tort in the same manner as a private corporation. Stat-
utes in most jurisdictions provide only that local housing authorities may sue and be
sued. Whereas the majority of these jurisdictions have held such legislation elimi-
nates a housing authority's preexisting governmental immunity, some find a waiver of
governmental immunity only where the housing authority acts in a proprietary capac-
ity. See Love, Landlord's Liabiltyfor Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence
1981]
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and several state officials," seeking enforcement of the state sanitary
code' 2 in BHA buildings.' 3 The Boston Housing Court,'4 finding
BHA and the Secretary of Communities and Developments jointly
or Strict Liabiliy?, 1975 Wis. L. Rav. 19, 79-80. See notes 35-40 and accompanying
text infra.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit in Alexander v. United States Dep't of Hous. and
Urban Dev., 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 437 U.S. 903 (1978), refused
to find an implied warranty of habitability in leases of federally-owned public hous-
ing. See 19 B.C.L. Rev. 343 (1978). The Alexander decision, however, does not seem
to preclude a judicial finding of an implied warranty of habitability in local housing
authority leases for federally-funded, as opposed to federally-owned, public housing.
See, e.g., Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843
(1973) (local housing authority lease held to contain implied warranty of habitability).
The rationale for this conclusion originates in the numerous recent decisions holding
that an implied warranty of habitability exists in private residential leases. See, e.g.,
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 629, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280
N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. App. 1973);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
10. Plaintiffs in Perez initiated the action in the Boston Housing Court, requesting
that the court enjoin BHA from allowing defective conditions to persist in the prem-
ises where plaintiffs and a class of approximately 40,000 BHA tenants live. Perez v.
Boston Hous. Auth., 368 Mass. 333, 334, 331 N.E.2d 801, 802 (1975).
Characteristically, the plaintiff in an institutional reform action sues as a represen-
tative of a group. For an extensive analysis of institutional reform plaintiffs, see Spe-
cial Project, supra note 2, at 870-901.
11. Shortly after initiating this action, plaintiffs in Perez added as party defend-
ants: the Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs; the Secretary of
Communities and Developments; the Treasurer of the Commonwealth; and the Gov-
ernor of the Commonwealth. 368 Mass. at 334, 331 N.E.2d at 802. MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 121B, §§ 26A, 31, 34, 41 and ch. 6A, §§ 4, 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1971)
place in the defendant state officials supervisory responsibilities over BHA and other
Massachusetts housing authorities. Plaintiffs contended, therefore, that chapter 111,
§ 127N subjected each state official to personal liability for sanitary code violations as
an "individual, trust or corporation, partnership or association, or other person who
.. . has the authority to decide whether to rehabilitate. . . the premises." MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 111, § 127N (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974).
12. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. Ill, § 127A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973). Pursuant
to ch. 111, § 127H:
Any tenant who rents a space in a building for residential purposes wherein a
condition exists which is in violation of the. . . state sanitary code. . . may file
a petition against the owner ofsaid building to enforce the provisions of the said
code in the superior court. ...
[Vol. 21:255
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/8
INSTITUTIONAL RECEIVERSHIPS
The court may:
(a) issue appropriate restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and injunc-
tions;
(b) authorize any or all tenants in the respondent's building wherein the vio-
lation exists to make rental payments. . . to the clerk of the ourt ... ;
(c) order all the tenants in the respondent's building wherein the violation
exists to vacate the premises, and order the board of health to close up said prem-
ises; or
(c) appoint a receiver.
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 11, § 127H (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972). (Emphasis added.)
Like Massachusetts, several other states have enacted housing codes containing re-
ceivership provisions. The following statutes adopt receivership as a remedy for
housing code violations: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Ch. 83a, § 47a-57a (West 1981);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd 1981-1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-9-
20 (Buns 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 566.25-29 (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 441-570 to -590 (Vernon 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-79 to -82 (West 1980-
1981); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(5) (McKinney 1980); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.07 (Baldwin 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24.2-2 to -11 (1980); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 823.22 (1977). Most of these statutes only permit officials responsible for
housing code enforcement to bring a receivership action. The Massachusetts, Minne-
sota and Wisconsin statutes, however, permit tenants to sue for receivership as well.
See Comment, Texas Landlord-Tenant Law and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act-
Afrrmative Remedies for the Tenant, 8 St. Mary's L.A 807, 825 (1977).
In the housing context, court-appointed receivers generally collect rents from ten-
ants in substandard housing and apply the payments to repairs. Id
13. In 1975, BHA owned and operated fifty-one developments in the Boston met-
ropolitan area, comprising 15,642 dwelling units. BHA leased an additional 2,714
dwelling units. More than ten percent of the entire Boston population resided in
BHA buildings. Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 368 Mass. 333, 342, 331 N.E.2d 801,
806-07 (1975).
The history of tenant suits against the BHA, spanning more than a decade, illus-
trates the complexity of the issues presented in Perez. In 1970, an association of ten-
ants residing at one particular BHA development sued BHA and the State
Department of Community Affairs (DCA), seeking enforcement of the state sanitary
code in that development. West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner of the
Dep't of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 297 N.E.2d 505 (1973). In affirming the
dismissal of that suit, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that in the
absence of a complaint plainly invoking chapter 111, § 127H (see note 12 supra), or
specifically alleging agency misconduct, the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a gen-
eral complaint against BHA and DCA even when based on undisputed sanitary code
violations. As filed, the complaint alleged only that BHA and DCA failed to satisfy
the Massachusetts statutory policy that local housing authorities maintain "decent,
safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations." 363 Mass. at 748,297 N.E. at 507. The
court specifically offered no opinion as to whether it possessed sufficient power under
any circumstances to place a public housing development in receivership. Id at 754
n.21, 297 N.E.2d at 511 n.21.
In Boston Pub. Hous. Tenants' Policy Council v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 493 (D. Mass.
1974), a comprehensive tenants association sought a court order pursuant to the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-40 (Supp. 1111979) ("the Act"),
directing the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
1981]
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liable for sanitary code violations,15 ordered the Secretary to provide
additional state funds to BHA for building rehabilitation.1 6 Follow-
ing partial reversal and remand,17 both the Housing Court and the
Massachusetts Superior Court,' 8 exercising statutory injunctive
to upgrade living conditions in 15 major BHA developments. Effectively shielding
HUD from similar suits by tenants of other federally funded local housing programs,
the court in Lynn held that the Act imposed upon HUD no judicially enforceable
duties to maintain minimum standards of habitability in federally-funded low-in-
come housing. 388 F. Supp. at 496. The Act only requires HUD to provide states
financial assistance in alleviating the shortage of habitable low-income housing; the
burden of administering the program rests on the local housing authorities. Id Thus,
Lynn acknowledges that the Act does not preempt state regulation of federally subsi-
dized low-income housing. Accord, Kargman v. Sullivan, 552 F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1977)
(local authorities held not preempted by the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1715(d)(2), (3) (Supp. 111 1979) from setting rents for federally funded housing
below the minimum level set by HUD). In closing its opinion, the Lynn court offered
the suggestion that the Boston Housing Court and State Legislature were better suited
than the federal courts to solve the BHA housing problems. 388 F. Supp. at 498.
The Lynn court also refuted an alternative theory presented by the BHA tenants.
When HUD subsidizes local housing authority developments, the Act requires HUD
and the recipient authority to sign an annual contributions contract. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1410(a) (Supp. III 1979). See generally D. MANDELKER, HoUSING SUBSIDIES IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND, 47-9 (1973). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1415(4)
(Supp. 11 1979), HUD has the authority to include in such contract a condition that
the recipient housing authority maintain habitable living conditions in its low-rent
dwellings. The Lynn court held that as "mere incidental beneficiaries" of the annual
contributions contract, BHA tenants lie outside the scope of protection afforded by
the Act, and therefore lacked standing to sue HUD officials as third party benefi-
ciaries under the contract. 388 F. Supp. at 496.
14. For a brief discussion of the Boston Housing Court's political history, jurisdic-
tion, powers, and operations see Garrity, The Boston Housing Court: An Encouraging
Response to Complex Issues, 17 URBAN L. ANN. 15 (1979). For similar discussions of
housing courts or their equivalents in other United States cities, see Symposium, 17
URBAN L. ANN. 3, 27-224 (1979).
15. 368 Mass. at 335, 331 N.E.2d at 803. Unlawful conditions in BHA buildings
affected a substantial percentage of Boston residents. Probably the great majority of
the BHA buildings were in substandard condition in violation of the sanitary code.
Id at 341, 331 N.E.2d at 806-07. See notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text supra.
16. 368 Mass. at 335-36, 331 N.E.2d at 803.
17. 368 Mass. 333, 331 N.E.2d 801 (1975). The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed
the Secretary of Communities and Developments, holding that "the legislature did
not intend to include the Secretary, or the Commonwealth, or any of its departments
or agencies among the entities described in [Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111,] § 127N as an
'individual, trust or corporation, partnership, association or other person."' Id at
338, 331 N.E.2d at 804. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
18. Judge Garrity was transferred to the Massachusetts Superior Court roughly a
year and a half after plaintiffs had initiated this action in the Boston Housing Court.
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power,19 made numerous efforts to compel performance by BHA.20
Having attempted less intrusive remedies to no avail,2 1 the Superior
Court ordered that BHA be placed in temporary receivership.
As recently as 1888, the rules of equity' restricted the issuance of
injunctions to the protection of private property, thus preventing
their use to vindicate personal or civil rights.2 4 This restriction,
On consent of the parties, the action was similarly transferred to leave it in the same
judicial hands. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 325, 335, 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1239.
19. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127H(2) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972). See note 12
and accompanying text supra.
20. Initially, the housing court appointed a master to gather information, prepare
draft orders responding to "especially intolerable individual situations," and propose
interim and long range maintenance and rehabilitation plans. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
330-31, 400 N.E.2d at 1236-37. Prior to September of 1976, the housing court judge,
often with the help of the master, made numerous attempts to alleviate or prevent
difficulties relating to substandard conditions in the management of BHA buildings.
Id at 331-32, 400 N.E.2d at 1237. During a 15-month period, the housing court
issued 25 separate orders, primarily directing BHA to make emergency repairs to its
housing developments. Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., No. 17222 (Mass. Sup. Ct. July
25, 1979).
Shortly after the appointed master submitted his report in July, 1976 indicating that
BHA had neither made any progress toward compliance nor was capable of doing so,
the plaintiffs moved to place BHA in receivership. Joined by plaintiff intervenor Bos-
ton Housing Tenants Policy Council, the parties instead negotiated a series of recom-
mendations for implementing necessary changes in the management of BHA
developments. The court then fashioned these and its own recommendations into a
decree to which BHA consented. Two years later, following a hearing that included
extensive testimony and evidence, the Superior Court found that BHA had failed to
comply with the consent decree. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh., 332-47, 400 N.E.2d at 1237-45.
21. Id at 347, 358-59, 400 N.E.2d at 1245, 1251.
22. Id at 347, 359, 331 N.E.2d at 1245, 1254. The Supreme Judicial Court, in
affirming the Superior Court order, modified it by making clear that the proposed
receivership would last only as long as necessary. BHA would incrementally regain
its functions when appropriate after notice and hearing. Id at 360, 400 N.E.2d at
1251-52.
In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court admonished Judge Garrity both for his
emphatic criticism of BHA's poor response to the court's remedial efforts and for his
several exparte communications with the parties, particularly BHA. These impropri-
eties, however, did not affect the substance of the proceeding, and thus did not consti-
tute reversible error. Id at 363-64, 400 N.E.2d at 1253-54.
23. See note I supra.
24. See In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888) (equity jurisdiction held inapplicable to
criminal action); Atkinson v. John E. Dougherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285
(1899) (court of equity held powerless to restrain a libelous publication); Gee v.
Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818) (power of injunction held applica-
ble to prevent publication of private letter by the recipient). See also G.T. BIsPHAM,
PRInCIPLES OF EQurry § 400, at 348-49 (11th ed. McCoy 1931) [hereinafter cited as
1981]
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largely attributable to the general prohibition of judicial involvement
in the political process,25 gradually eroded as federal courts invoked
the fiction that certain constitutionally protected rights constitute per-
sonal property.26 Once over this conceptual hurdle, the courts were
competent to enjoin public institutions for the purpose of protecting
purely personal rights.2 7
The fiction that certain constitutional rights amount to property
rights enforceable in equity against public institutions became some-
what strained in situations involving receiverships.2" Courts origi-
nally appointed receivers to take custody of disputed real property to
prevent the party in possession from causing waste or mismanaging
rents and profits.29 As property concepts expanded and corporate en-
BISPHAM]; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 118-20; Note, Receivershop as a Remedy in Civil
Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 115, 118-19 (1969); Neoreceivershos, supra note 1,
at 1173.
25. One limit on the types of questions that federal courts may adjudicate
originates in the "political question" doctrine. Under this doctrine a federal court
may not address questions that a coordinate branch of the federal government should
resolve. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (legislative apportionment);
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (foreign affairs); Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939) (process of amending the Constitution or statutes); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 178 (1831) (the status of Indian Tribes). See Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Questiom A4 Functianal Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517,
538-39 (1966); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REv. 296, 315-16 (1925);
Neoreceivershps, supra note 1, at 1173 n.92.
26. See Joiner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512, 517 (W.D. Tenn. 1934). There a
federal district court relied on the fiction that the right to vote is a property right in
order to enjoin a state governor and several other state officials from interfering with
a black plaintiffs franchise.
27. See Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
(fourteenth amendment right to desegregated public education); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (same); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966)
(fourth amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches); Alabama v.
United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (fifteenth amendment
right to vote).
28. Federal courts have demonstrated considerable reluctance in placing state
agencies in receivership, nominally the most intrusive form of equitable relief avail-
able in institutional reform litigation. Instead, federal courts have frequently ap-
pointed parajudicial officers bearing official titles other than "receiver" to assume
many of the same responsibilities normally undertaken by receivers. One commenta-
tor has described these appointments as "neoreceiverships." Neoreceiverships, supra
note 1, at 1173-80.
29. The appointment of a receiver is one of the oldest equitable remedies associ-
ated with the court of chancery. The receiver, theoretically an indifferent person be-
tween the parties, takes possession of property in dispute as a custodian for the benefit
of the party ultimately entitled thereto. A court may appoint a receiver where the
[Vol. 21:255
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terprise grew, courts of equity discovered new uses for receivers
within the commercial context.3" Chancery thus gradually extended
the receiver's duties to the management of corporations and certain
forms of intangible property, such as licenses and patents.31
In the public sector, however, the receivership approach encoun-
tered substantial doctrinal obstacles at both federal and state levels.32
holder of legal title is incompetent or untrustworthy; where equitable rights in prop-
erty might become endangered by leaving it in the possession of the holder of legal
title; or where rights of remaindermen or reversioners might be jeopardized.BISPHAM, srupra note 24, at 450-53. See generally I R. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS §§ 4, 11-12, at 4-5, 13-16 (3d ed. Anderson 1959)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK]; Brakel, supra note 1, at 558-59; Note, Monitors: A New
Equitable Remedy, 70 YALE L.J. 103, 107-08 (1960).
While a receiver may serve a variety of different specific functions concerning the
property in question, all receivers fall within two basic categories: receiverspendente
lite, and receivers after judgment. Apendente lite receiver takes custody of the prop-
erty only during the course of litigation or other judicial proceeding. CLARK, supra,
§ 13, at 17. See, e.g., Stokes v. Hoffman House, 167 N.Y. 554, 60 N.E. 667 (1901)
(receiverpendente lite of a hotel held not absolutely liable for rent accrued on leased
premises in his possession). Receivers after judgment either preserve the property in
question pending appeal, or satisfy the judgment by application or operation of the
property. CLARK, supra, § 14, at 17. See, e.g., Hurst Production Co. v. Burrage, 104
S.W.2d 34 (Tex. 1937) (receiver appointed to enforce a judgment concerning title to
mining property); See generally Neoreceivershps, supra note 1, at 1166-67.
Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes a court of equity's au-
thority to appoint a receiver to assist the court in enforcing its judgment. The Rule
provides that:
If a judgment directs a party. . . to perform any... specific act and the party
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done
at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court
and the act when so done has a like effect as if done by the party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 70.
30. See generally Brakel, supra note 1, at 559; Neoreceivershps, supra note 1, at
1167-72.
31. See, e.g., Krieda v. Independence League of America, 188 Wash. 376,62 P.2d
1101 (1936) (insolvency of corporation); Henderson v. Palmer Union Oil Co., 29 Cal.
App. 451, 220 P. 672 (1916) (distribution of corporation no longer in existence);
Supreme Sitting of the Order of the Iron Hall v. Baker, 134 Ind. 293 (1893) (misman-
agement of corporate affairs). See generally CLARK, supra note 29, §§ 156-57 at 245;
J.F. GLUCK AND A. BACKER, THE LAW OF RECEIVERS OF CORPORATIONS, §§ 10-20,
at 31-49 (1891).
32. Doctrinal limitations on a federal court's power to appoint a receiver may be
intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic limitations require that remedial power exercised by a
court be judicial in nature (i.e., not peculiar to the executive or legislative branches)
and within the boundaries of equitable discretion. Extrinsic limitations consist of
constraints on judicial remedial power external to the court, such as federalism. Spe-
cial Project, supra note 2, at 858-69.
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For instance, institutional defendants are typically state or local
agencies charged with depriving individuals of their civil rights.33
The doctrine of federalism often prevents placing such defendants in
receivership, by requiring that federal courts of equity intrude as lit-
tle as possible into state and local affairs when enforcing federal
law.34
Doctrinal obstacles to receivership also exist in actions against state
agencies charged with violating state law.35 Sovereign immunity, for
example, often precludes courts from entertaining suits brought
against state agencies exercising traditional governmental func-
tions.36 Although state agencies cast in purely proprietary roles gen-
33. See note 2 supra.
34. Generally, the federalism doctrine limits the federal government, including
the judiciary, in the extent to which it may intervene in and interfere with state affairs.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (FLSA amendments held
to obstruct employer-employee relationships in traditional state governmental func-
tions); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (federal complaint dismissed where
state criminal proceedings had begun against federal plaintiff after federal complaint
was filed but before proceedings on the merits in federal court); Sammuels v. Mackel,
401 U.S. 66 (1971) (state criminal defendant held not entitled to declaratory relief in
federal court on basis of invalid state statute once the state criminal proceeding is
underway); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (state criminal defendant denied
equitable relief in federal court, even if state law in question is unconstitutional,
where alleged injury is incidental to all bona fide state criminal prosecutions).
35. The intrinsic limitations on a court's power to appoint a receiver in a state law
proceeding are similar in nature to those on courts in cases of federal law. Thus, the
separation of powers doctrine, an intragovernmental principle closely related to the
political question doctrine, limits the state judiciary from exercising powers or func-
tions belonging to another branch of state government. Similarly, the doctrine of
equitable discretion imposes intrinsic constraints on courts in state law proceedings.
See notes 41-45 and accompanying text infra. An additional limitation on receiver-
ship appointments under state law not present in most federal court institutional cases
is the doctrine of sovereign immunity discussed in the text accompanying notes 36-37
infra.
36. The doctrine of sovereign immunity forbids actions against the state or any
action amounting to one against the state in its own courts without its express or
clearly implied constitutional or statutory consent. Principality of Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (Mississippi held immune from suit by foreign state on
bonds issued by Mississippi); Clark v. State, Dept. of Labor, 7 IMI. App. 2d 365, 219
N.E.2d 143 (1966) (state held immune from unemployment compensation suit with-
out its consent); Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 619, 142 N.E.2d 347 (1957)
(Massachusetts held immune from private nuisance suit unless permitted by state stat-
ute or constitution). Accordingly, state agencies exercising traditional government
functions generally enjoy sovereign immunity. Ziel v. Adirondack Mountain Author-
ity, 230 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1962) (state authority held immune from action alleging state
employee's negligence in operating a state vehicle); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. West
Virginia Turnpike Comm'n, 143 W. Va. 913, 105 S.E.2d 630 (1958) (state held im-
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erally lack sovereign immunity,37 the residual separation of powers
doctrine3" may insulate even these departments from judicial inter-
ference.39 Consequently, some jurisdictions permit receiverships
under state law only where explicitly authorized by state statute."
Another stringent limitation on institutional receiverships, the doc-
trine of equitable discretion,4 requires that courts strike a balance
mune from suit by gas company alleging negligence in the construction of a state
turnpike).
37. See Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 44
Ill. 2d 207, 254 N.E.2d 522 (1969) (Board of trustees not protected by sovereign im-
munity); National Surety Corp. v. Barth, 8 N.J. 121, 84 A.2d 1 (1951) (State Housing
Authority held liable for money due under a construction contract); Applewhite v.
Memphis State University, 495 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. 1973) (state university held im-
mune in action for libel, but university-owned publishing company not similarly pro-
tected).
38. The separation of powers doctrine operates horizontally, i.e., it addresses the
relationships between coordinate branches of government at the same level ofgovern-
ment. The doctrine serves as a safeguard against concentration of the three funda-
mental powers of democratic government in one department or another, and applies
in the context of state government, Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 Il1.
425, 14 N.E.2d 485 (1938) (state welfare act improperly permits judicial review of
policy decisions within the discretion of the executive department), as well as federal,
Baker v. Carr, 269 U.S. 186, 210-11,217 (1962) (equality of state legislative apportion-
ment for congressional representation held justiciable under the 14th amendment).
See generally Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 J. COLO. L. REv. 529 (1969);
Roberts, supra note 2, at 84-6.
39. See, e.g., Borreson v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 368 Ill. 425, 14 N.E.2d 485
(1938); Massey v. Howard, 240 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1951) (receivership held inappropri-
ate to satisfy judgment against local drainage district in absence of authorizing stat-
ute); City of Enterprises v. State, 156 Ore. 623, 69 P.2d 953 (1937) (state act
authorizing the appointment of a receiver to control insolvent municipal corporations
held invalid).
40. Farmington Tp. v. Warrenville State Bank, 185 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1950) (re-
ceiver appointed to operate township water system under state revenue bond act);
Massey v. Howard, 240 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1951); City of Enterprises v. State, 156 Ore.
623, 69 P.2d 953 (1937).
Like Massachusetts, several other states have enacted housing codes containing re-
ceivership provisions for the management and repair of substandard buildings. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Ch. 83a, §§ 47a-57a (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 24,
§ 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd 1981-82); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-79 to -82 (West 1980-81);
N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney 1980). Until Perez, however, no court
had previously imposed receivership upon a local housing authority. See generally
Loeb, The Low Income Tenant in California 4 Study in Frustration, 21 HAST. L.J.
287, 312-15 (1970).
41. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1976); Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241, 1242 (1st Cir. 1975); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138, 151 (4th Cir. 1970).
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between the intrusiveness and the effectiveness of the remedy when
granting equitable relief.42 Often couched in terms of familiar max-
ims,43 the doctrine of equitable discretion merely reflects general eq-
uitable principles." Some courts have held, however, that where a
state statute prescribes receivership, the statute, rather than general
principles of equity, determines availability of that remedy.4 -
Despite the rigorous constraints on judicial interference with state
affairs, a few institutional receiverships have occurred within the
realm of federal civil rights cases. In Turner v. Goolsby,46 a federal
district court in Georgia placed a county school system in receiver-
ship.47 In a conspiracy to prevent racial integration, defendant
school board arranged for all the white students in the county to be
transferred and bussed into neighboring counties at the state's ex-
pense.48 After enjoining the school board from further denying
plaintiffs their constitutional right to desegregated public education,
the district court, exercising general equitable power, appointed a re-
ceiver to assist the court in implementing the injunction.4 9 The dis-
42. See Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions ofPrison Confinement: An Analysis
of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under
the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 893, 921 (1977); Special Project, spra note
2, at 860-62. See also Morgan v. McDonough, 548 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1977) (court
ordered increasingly intrusive forms of equitable relief after finding "less restrictive
alternatives" ineffective).
43. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 24-5 n.24; Special Project, supra note 2, at 861,
citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (equity does not punish); Deweese v.
Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897) (he who comes in equity must come with clean
hands); Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 215 (1830) (equity will not
grant relief if there exists an adequate remedy at law); Hearne v. Smylie, 255 F. Supp.
645, 655 (D. Idaho), rev'dper curiam, 378 U.S. 563 (1964) (equity will not issue a
decree it cannot enforce).
44. Special Project, supra note 2, at 861. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S.
533, 585 (1964) ("general equitable principles"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250
(1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 419 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976) ("established principles").
45. See Farmington Tp. v. Warrenville State Bank, 185 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1950)
(receiver appointed to operate township water system under state revenue bond act);
Vogel v. Chappel, 194 OkI. 335, 6 N.E.2d 953 (1937) (appointment of receiver for a
contracting company held appropriate under state statute); Zanes v. Mercantile Bank
and Trust of Texas, 49 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1932) (appointment of receiver for partner-
ship equity in stocks held proper under state statute).
46. 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1965).
47. Id at 730.
48. Id at 727-28.
49. Id at 730.
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trict court in Turner undeniably faced compelling circumstances;
neither the school board nor the superintendent had taken action ei-
ther to stop the illegal expenditure of public funds or to accord the
rights in question.5" The following year, after the school board had
planned a desegregated school system for the county under the re-
ceiver's supervision, the court terminated the receivership.5'
Turner represents the exception to the rule; courts in institutional
cases have typically avoided establishing formal receiverships by ap-
pointing officers bearing various other official titles52 to perform
some of the same duties ordinarily assumed by receivers.53 On only
rare occasions since Turner have federal courts felt compelled to ap-
point full-fledged receivers to take control of state agencies. In Mor-
gan v. Kerrigan,54 a federal district court had enjoined the Boston
School Committee from denying black children their Fourteenth
Amendment right to attend a unitary school system without exper-
iencing verbal and physical abuse.55 Unable to elicit more than mini-
mal compliance from the committee,56 the court appointed a receiver
to implement the previously ineffective injunctive orders.57 In af-
firming the district court order, the First Circuit enunciated the pre-
vailing principle governing temporary institutional receiverships.
Under the Morgan standard, a court of equity may place a state insti-
tution in receivership to enforce injunctions only when contempt pro-
ceedings and further injunctions are unlikely to elicit compliance.58
Clearly, the test is one of "reasonableness under the circum-
stances";59 that is, receivership must be a court's "only reasonable
50. Id
51. Id at 734.
52. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (appointment of a
Human Rights Committee in part to upgrade prison medical facilities); Kapral v.
Jepson, 271 F. Supp. 74 (D.C. Conn. 1967) (appointment of a special master to for-
mulate a final municipal redistricting plan).
53. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976). See notes 4 and
29 supra.
54. 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aft'dsub nomL Morgan v. McDonough, 540
F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
55. 540 F.2d at 530-31.
56. Id
57. Id. at 529.
58. Id at 533; Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 325, 358,
400 N.E.2d 1231, 1250 n.32 (1980); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628,637 (M.D.
Ala. 1979).
59. 540 F.2d at 533.
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alternative" to noncompliance with its remedial plan.6"
The standard of "reasonableness under the circumstances" estab-
lished in Morgan has since gained recognition in the context of
prison reform litigation. In Newman v. Alabama,6 1 a federal district
court placed the Alabama state prison system in receivership to en-
sure compliance with injunctions outstanding for six years.6 Faced
with barbaric prison conditions demanding swift and effective reme-
dial action,63 the Newman court, like the court in Morgan, viewed the
appointment of a receiver as the only reasonable alternative in light
of the defendant institution's noncompliance.' 4 Furthermore, the
Newman court reminded the state Board of Corrections that in an
earlier Alabama prison reform case, Pugh v. Locke,65 the district
court had threatened to close several state prison facilities if the
Board failed to comply with minimum standards required by the
court's decree.66 Although the Pugh court never found it necessary to
execute its threat, the meaning of the Pugh dictum is clear: where
constitutional rights are at stake, conventional restraints67 will not
prevent federal courts from exercising extensive injunctive control
over certain state activities.68
Unlike Turner, Morgan and Newman, the court in Perez based its
decision entirely on a state statute,69 involving neither constitutional
60. Id
61. 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
62. In October of 1972, in Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala.
1972), the federal district court "held that the failure of the Board of Corrections to
afford the basic elements of adequate medical care to inmates in the Alabama Prison
System constituted a 'willful and intentional' violation of their rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments." 466 F. Supp. at 629. As of 1978, though some pro-
gress had been made, "the Board of Corrections [had] not in several critical areas
achieved substantial compliance with the Court's orders" issued in 1972. Id at 630.
63. Id at 630-35.
64. Id at 635.
65. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976). See generally Robbins & Buser, s.upra
note 42.
66. 466 F. Supp. at 635; 406 F. Supp. at 331.
67. See notes 32-34, 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
68. An appropriate example is Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360
F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aft'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 977
(1974), where the district court not only ordered that a detailed set of prison operation
instructions be carried out, but also ordered a reduction in the number of prisoners
being held at the jail in question. Id.
69. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 111, § 127H (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972).
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law nor other tenet of federalism.7" The state statute in issue7' pro-
vided the Massachusetts Superior Court sufficient equitable power to
place the BHA in receivership;72 however, the lack of precedent de-
termining the propriety of enforcing such a statute against a state
agency compelled the Massachusetts judiciary to examine equitable
principles established in the federal courts. Comparing the trial court
decision to federal court orders in recent institutional reform litiga-
tion, the Perez court concluded that the Superior Court had not
abused equitable discretion in its exercise of statutory power.73 To
that end, the Perez court acknowledged the Superior Court's pru-
dence in exercising restraint by reluctantly approving receivership
only when no reasonable alternative to BHA's noncompliance re-
mained.'
Distinguishing the case at hand from Turner, Morgan and New-
man, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that re-
ceivership seemed much less radical in Perez than it would in more
usual cases of institutional reform.75 Not only was there no question
of federalism involved,76 but the public body enjoined, the BHA, ex-
ercised only proprietary functions, much like a business corporation
to which receivership often attaches. 7 The Perez court's analogy im-
plies that had the BHA been a state school or prison system, only
circumstances as compelling as those in Turner, Morgan or Newman
would have warranted receivership. Thus, where a defendant state
agency's services are more "public" than "proprietary", the separa-
tion of powers doctrine78 diminishes the desirability of granting in-
trusive equitable relief under state law.
Institutional reform litigation preceding Perez had uniformly ad-
70. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 359, 400 N.E.2d at 1251.
71. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127H (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972). See note 12
and accompanying text supra.
72. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 352-54, 400 N.E.2d at 1248.
73. Id at 357-59, 400 N.E.2d at 1250, 1251.
74. Id at 357-58, 364-65, 400 N.E.2d at 1251, 1254.
75. Id at 359, 400 N.E.2d at 1251.
76. Id
77. Id Local housing authorities function primarily to provide low and middle-
income housing along with managerial services normally incident to apartment rent-
als. Once the legislative decision to establish the authority has been made, the au-
thority itself does not participate in any traditional government functions; the
authority operates as a non-profit proprietor of rental dwellings.
78. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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dressed preservation of federally protected rights, both constitu-
tional79 and statutory.80 This pattern most likely will continue, if
only because of its effectiveness in initiating at least minor change.
The extent to which receivership will play a role in future institu-
tional reform litigation, in both federal and state courts, remains un-
certain. Because institutional receiverships require a great deal of
post-appointment judicial supervision,'1 few courts to date have ven-
tured along this path of remedial relief.
Although Perez may not affect the well formulated federal law
which it parallels, this important decision adds a new dimension-
suing state agencies in their proprietary capacity--to the field of large
scale institutional reform. Potential institutional reform litigants
must now take a closer look at proprietary responsibilities assumed
by state agencies. The greatest impact of Perez, however, lies in the
court's approval of a temporary institutional receivership based on
state law. Perez puts recalcitrant state agencies providing only ?ro-
prietary services, particularly metropolitan housing authorities,3 on
notice that they lack inherent immunity from highly intrusive equita-
ble relief granted under state law. Moreover, Perez also alerts state
79. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
80. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. (emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343a(3), (4) (Supp. 1111979) has since empow-
ered federal district courts:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Consti-
tution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; (4) To
recover damages or secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
A4 (emphasis added).
81. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
82. In addition to that of the Boston Metropolitan area, public housing crises have
long existed in major urban centers nationally. For a detailed discussion of financial
and managerial problems common to urban public housing programs, see J.C.
WEICHER, HOUSING-FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 12-82 (1980). See gener-
ally I.H. WELFIELD, R.F. MuTH, H.G. WEHNER & J.C. WEICHER, PERSPECTIVES ON
HousING AND URBAN RENEWAL 15-32 (1975).
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legislatures that the implements of institutional reform lie not only
within the reach of the courts and Congress, 3 but within their reach
as well.
Mitchell Bryan
83. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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